ClayBarham
08-07-2007, 05:09 PM
When should a community of free citizens pass a law that elevates the seriousness of a crime or speech because of hate? If my neighbor throws trash on my property day after day, and I react by calling him a name or punching out his lights, would my actions be worse because I hate his guts for doing what he does? Looks like it will, if the hero of Chappiquitit has his way.
The hero’s legislation targets a crime motivated out of hatred for someone’s race, ethnic background or sexual orientation. Every crime consists of two parts. The first, and most essential part, is the act itself. The second part is intent. If I entered a bank, drew out a weapon and told the teller to give me the money, which is not mine, then I am acting criminally and my intention to do so is an integral part of the act, because I am willfully doing it. The two parts can join as any reasonable person could see.
Now, let us say I whip out a weapon and rob someone of a different color, ethnic origin or sexual orientation than myself. The act exists, and the intent to act is obvious. The new Hate Crimes legislation is saying that there are now two parts to the intent. The first is simply the intent to enrich myself by robbing the victim. The addition to intent says that I selected him to victimize because he is different from me, and I am more motivated to punish him for being different than because I need his property. A crime, then, will now consist of three parts. The act is one. Intent is two and three, as if one kind of intent is more important. If my victim comes from the majority, I being the one differing in race, ethnic origin or sexual orientation, does that make my crime less important or even justified because I am getting some sort of retribution.
This opens an interesting perspective on what crime and punishment will become if the Hero’s legislation passes. Will the intent to do an unlawful act reduce the crime, if just to take from someone who has, to give to me as one who has not? Then, if the victim is different from the actor, is the crime based only on intent to act on hatred? If I say I do not hate the victim and can prove it, would that then excuse the act, or simply reduce the punishment for it? Is intent excusable, and the severity of the crime reduced, if it were simply to help myself to what someone else has, as long as not traced back to hatred?
The danger in this kind of legislation, easily attributed to an empty suit like the Hero, is that a criminal act is qualified as if to excuse it with one intention and not another. We do that with homicide now, in that there is a premeditated to a justifiable class. The act is committed the same even when justified. This means an armed robbery can be justified if it is not done out of hate.
The hate crimes legislation from the Hero would result in crimes classed as in the crime of murder. A premeditated crime would be one with an intention to do the act motivated by hatred of race, ethnicity or sexual orientation, or just plain discrimination. That kind of crime would be a capital crime, just like first-degree murder. It would be negligence if the act were just to relieve someone of their property, beat them or even break a few bones, and that would earn the actor an insignificant punishment.
We enter another arena of problems, then, with American law. If the actor is innocent until proven guilty, and a prosecutor must, representing the people, prove one’s guilt, then that becomes even more difficult with the Hero’s legislation. The prosecutor has to prove the actor intended to do the crime. It is simple when the criminal points a gun at the bank teller and demands all the money, because the intention ties directly to the act. The criminal would not be doing it unless he intended to do it.
If a man points a gun at someone, say a Gay, illegal alien from Africa and demands his money, does he intend to rob the alien because he hates him, or because he wants his money. The prosecutor, in American law, must prove which it is, if these crimes are supposed to fall in one class or another. How can he prove intent? All the criminal has to say is, “No, I never intended to rob him because he was different, only because I needed his money.â€
That means, the Hero must turn the tables of American law and use Old World law, and the suspect must prove he did not intend to discriminate, because the very act of robbing the alien must prove, on its own, that discrimination was a part of his intent. Had he robbed someone just like himself, then the obvious intent would be that he just wanted the money.
Leave it to the Hero of Chappiquitit to screw up the law. I am certain the Democratic socialists in the Senate, along with some of the weak-kneed Republicans, will support the Hero’s legislation, and Bush may even sign it to appease them.
The hero’s legislation targets a crime motivated out of hatred for someone’s race, ethnic background or sexual orientation. Every crime consists of two parts. The first, and most essential part, is the act itself. The second part is intent. If I entered a bank, drew out a weapon and told the teller to give me the money, which is not mine, then I am acting criminally and my intention to do so is an integral part of the act, because I am willfully doing it. The two parts can join as any reasonable person could see.
Now, let us say I whip out a weapon and rob someone of a different color, ethnic origin or sexual orientation than myself. The act exists, and the intent to act is obvious. The new Hate Crimes legislation is saying that there are now two parts to the intent. The first is simply the intent to enrich myself by robbing the victim. The addition to intent says that I selected him to victimize because he is different from me, and I am more motivated to punish him for being different than because I need his property. A crime, then, will now consist of three parts. The act is one. Intent is two and three, as if one kind of intent is more important. If my victim comes from the majority, I being the one differing in race, ethnic origin or sexual orientation, does that make my crime less important or even justified because I am getting some sort of retribution.
This opens an interesting perspective on what crime and punishment will become if the Hero’s legislation passes. Will the intent to do an unlawful act reduce the crime, if just to take from someone who has, to give to me as one who has not? Then, if the victim is different from the actor, is the crime based only on intent to act on hatred? If I say I do not hate the victim and can prove it, would that then excuse the act, or simply reduce the punishment for it? Is intent excusable, and the severity of the crime reduced, if it were simply to help myself to what someone else has, as long as not traced back to hatred?
The danger in this kind of legislation, easily attributed to an empty suit like the Hero, is that a criminal act is qualified as if to excuse it with one intention and not another. We do that with homicide now, in that there is a premeditated to a justifiable class. The act is committed the same even when justified. This means an armed robbery can be justified if it is not done out of hate.
The hate crimes legislation from the Hero would result in crimes classed as in the crime of murder. A premeditated crime would be one with an intention to do the act motivated by hatred of race, ethnicity or sexual orientation, or just plain discrimination. That kind of crime would be a capital crime, just like first-degree murder. It would be negligence if the act were just to relieve someone of their property, beat them or even break a few bones, and that would earn the actor an insignificant punishment.
We enter another arena of problems, then, with American law. If the actor is innocent until proven guilty, and a prosecutor must, representing the people, prove one’s guilt, then that becomes even more difficult with the Hero’s legislation. The prosecutor has to prove the actor intended to do the crime. It is simple when the criminal points a gun at the bank teller and demands all the money, because the intention ties directly to the act. The criminal would not be doing it unless he intended to do it.
If a man points a gun at someone, say a Gay, illegal alien from Africa and demands his money, does he intend to rob the alien because he hates him, or because he wants his money. The prosecutor, in American law, must prove which it is, if these crimes are supposed to fall in one class or another. How can he prove intent? All the criminal has to say is, “No, I never intended to rob him because he was different, only because I needed his money.â€
That means, the Hero must turn the tables of American law and use Old World law, and the suspect must prove he did not intend to discriminate, because the very act of robbing the alien must prove, on its own, that discrimination was a part of his intent. Had he robbed someone just like himself, then the obvious intent would be that he just wanted the money.
Leave it to the Hero of Chappiquitit to screw up the law. I am certain the Democratic socialists in the Senate, along with some of the weak-kneed Republicans, will support the Hero’s legislation, and Bush may even sign it to appease them.