Athena
06-25-2006, 11:51 PM
Eisenhower did not demobilize the US following WWII but embedded it in every aspect of our lives, than warned the need to keep in under control. Bush Senior and Bush Junior spoke of the New World Order and this is what it looks like from the visionary perspective of Dr. Naumann before the first world war:
Charles Sarolea's "The Anglo-German Problem" was published in 1915. He gives us Dr. Naumann's thoughts and then says:
"Whether Dr. Naumann is right or wrong, there can be no doubt that General von Bernhjardi studiously avoids the tremendous economical and organizing issues raised by modern warfare; and the reason probably is that he could not have done so without trespassing on the province of controversial politics. He would have had to examine wither the patriarchal and feudal regime in Germany is calculated to encourage that organizing genius and that technical preparation which,. according to Dr. Naumann, will be so vital in the war of the future."
Now to back track, to go back to what Dr. Naumann has to say, Sarolea introduces Dr. Naumann:
"It is interesting to compare Bernhardi's views with those of one of the ablest parliamentary leaders and publicists of Germany. Dr. Fredrich Naumann has emphasized the fundamental differences between the war of yesterday and the war of to-morrow, and has pointed out what will be the chief difficulties the military command will have to contend with.
The war of the future is a problem of economic organization of the most difficult nature and the highest technological achievement, such as has never been hitherto demanded from any army. The old military qualities must give way to the organizing qualities. No doubt the courage and endurance of the individual soldier must remain for all times the foundation of military power, but organizing genius (what is the name of the piss ant who directed our futile attack on people who were not our enemies and our vice president who ran the company that is making a future on this war against, Iraq) is required in order not to waste that courage and endurance. This is clearly shown from a mere examination of the colossal numbers engaged. To transport, to locate, and to feed these masses of men is the daily preoccupation of the military authorities. That they rightly understand the nature of the problem is certain, but it is very doubtful whether the problem can ever be adequately solved by commanders who are recruited from the Junkertum. Mere military capacity does not suffice here. Both enemies and friends admit that our corps of officers possess such military capacity. Anxiety only arises with regard to the other qualifications. We know that our industry possess in its industries successful organizers, brains accustomed to direct great quanties of material and "personnel"- men who create new conditions of life for whole economic districts without having to appeal to any authority. As democratic politicians we may often have to oppose bitterly those captains of industry, but if it comes to war we shall be willing to be led by them, because we know that they have the brains. It is true that they must not meddle with the technical duties of the officers, but the administration of the war material must be their province. And even with regard to the technique of war, it becomes from year to year more questionable whether this can be managed more efficiently by a corps of noblemen than by the representatives of middle class technique (industrial leaders). However much we may value the moral qualities of the ruling class-and, with all political difference of opinion, we shall not minimize those qualities- we must admit that we are witnessing a transformation of methods of attack and defence which in addition to the old question of iron discipline raises the modern question: how far shall we be able on the battlefield to replace the human unit through machinery? It is obvious that this will never succeed completely, for there does not exist a machine which does not need a human soul to work it. At the same time it is doubtless that in this direction mighty changes are at hand. We can see here a repetition of the process which we notice in nearly all industries- the subordination and displacement of human labour in mines, machines, and means of transport. If you examine a weaving mill you shall find comparatively few men; the whole place is already full of the produce of labour which has been accomplished elsewhere. Even so in war: the front ranks must be supplied with human units in as limited a quantity as possible: but those units must have the mechanical ability in the blood. Those conditions do already exist to a large extent in naval warfare. Ships are built and equipped with an insignificant number of men compared to their fighting power. But those men must work like animated machines. Even so the air fleet of to-morrow will demand a large amount of technical application and technical ability, but very few military units. War is becoming impersonal, and is becoming reduced to a rivalry of money and economics. That even here military members of the nobility may achieve great results is shown by the admirable example of Count Zeppelin. But the impression remains that there still survive in the army the traditions of the pre-industrial age- traditions not only of loyalty and discipline, but also of technical ignorance. We have still too much of the parade soldier whose knees are more pliable than his fingers or brain. The industrializing of the army is coming, but very slowly. It begins with the artillery, but it ends at the Calvary. We have still failed fully to realize that under a system of universal service a nation pays labours in order that its weapons shall be absolutely of the first class. The nation which can put the best technique into the military service will probably, in the altered conditions of modern warfare achieve victory."
Charles Sarolea's "The Anglo-German Problem" was published in 1915. He gives us Dr. Naumann's thoughts and then says:
"Whether Dr. Naumann is right or wrong, there can be no doubt that General von Bernhjardi studiously avoids the tremendous economical and organizing issues raised by modern warfare; and the reason probably is that he could not have done so without trespassing on the province of controversial politics. He would have had to examine wither the patriarchal and feudal regime in Germany is calculated to encourage that organizing genius and that technical preparation which,. according to Dr. Naumann, will be so vital in the war of the future."
Now to back track, to go back to what Dr. Naumann has to say, Sarolea introduces Dr. Naumann:
"It is interesting to compare Bernhardi's views with those of one of the ablest parliamentary leaders and publicists of Germany. Dr. Fredrich Naumann has emphasized the fundamental differences between the war of yesterday and the war of to-morrow, and has pointed out what will be the chief difficulties the military command will have to contend with.
The war of the future is a problem of economic organization of the most difficult nature and the highest technological achievement, such as has never been hitherto demanded from any army. The old military qualities must give way to the organizing qualities. No doubt the courage and endurance of the individual soldier must remain for all times the foundation of military power, but organizing genius (what is the name of the piss ant who directed our futile attack on people who were not our enemies and our vice president who ran the company that is making a future on this war against, Iraq) is required in order not to waste that courage and endurance. This is clearly shown from a mere examination of the colossal numbers engaged. To transport, to locate, and to feed these masses of men is the daily preoccupation of the military authorities. That they rightly understand the nature of the problem is certain, but it is very doubtful whether the problem can ever be adequately solved by commanders who are recruited from the Junkertum. Mere military capacity does not suffice here. Both enemies and friends admit that our corps of officers possess such military capacity. Anxiety only arises with regard to the other qualifications. We know that our industry possess in its industries successful organizers, brains accustomed to direct great quanties of material and "personnel"- men who create new conditions of life for whole economic districts without having to appeal to any authority. As democratic politicians we may often have to oppose bitterly those captains of industry, but if it comes to war we shall be willing to be led by them, because we know that they have the brains. It is true that they must not meddle with the technical duties of the officers, but the administration of the war material must be their province. And even with regard to the technique of war, it becomes from year to year more questionable whether this can be managed more efficiently by a corps of noblemen than by the representatives of middle class technique (industrial leaders). However much we may value the moral qualities of the ruling class-and, with all political difference of opinion, we shall not minimize those qualities- we must admit that we are witnessing a transformation of methods of attack and defence which in addition to the old question of iron discipline raises the modern question: how far shall we be able on the battlefield to replace the human unit through machinery? It is obvious that this will never succeed completely, for there does not exist a machine which does not need a human soul to work it. At the same time it is doubtless that in this direction mighty changes are at hand. We can see here a repetition of the process which we notice in nearly all industries- the subordination and displacement of human labour in mines, machines, and means of transport. If you examine a weaving mill you shall find comparatively few men; the whole place is already full of the produce of labour which has been accomplished elsewhere. Even so in war: the front ranks must be supplied with human units in as limited a quantity as possible: but those units must have the mechanical ability in the blood. Those conditions do already exist to a large extent in naval warfare. Ships are built and equipped with an insignificant number of men compared to their fighting power. But those men must work like animated machines. Even so the air fleet of to-morrow will demand a large amount of technical application and technical ability, but very few military units. War is becoming impersonal, and is becoming reduced to a rivalry of money and economics. That even here military members of the nobility may achieve great results is shown by the admirable example of Count Zeppelin. But the impression remains that there still survive in the army the traditions of the pre-industrial age- traditions not only of loyalty and discipline, but also of technical ignorance. We have still too much of the parade soldier whose knees are more pliable than his fingers or brain. The industrializing of the army is coming, but very slowly. It begins with the artillery, but it ends at the Calvary. We have still failed fully to realize that under a system of universal service a nation pays labours in order that its weapons shall be absolutely of the first class. The nation which can put the best technique into the military service will probably, in the altered conditions of modern warfare achieve victory."