lily
03-21-2007, 12:32 AM
Link (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17659938/site/newsweek/?rf=nwnewsletter)
Looking for Nukes
By David Albright
Newsweek International
March 26, 2007 issue - How hard could it be to find hundreds of tons of
radioactive nuclear material? We've certainly got plenty of motivation to
keep tabs on this stuff. There's the threat of terrorist groups like Al
Qaeda, the standoff between Pakistan's and India's arsenals and North
Korea's Kim Jong Il. Iran, the next big nuclear challenge, already has
missiles that can strike Israel and a thriving civilian nuclear-power
program. It claims to have no ambition for nuclear weapons, but verifying
this is critical. We must know how much to press for a diplomatic solution
or how seriously to consider a military strike.
Nuclear intelligence, however, is problematic. Despite all the high-tech
gear that intelligence agencies have developed, facts on the ground are so
thin that the whole question of what countries like Iran are doing with
nuclear weapons is vulnerable to manipulation by policymakers. Who can
forget how Condoleezza Rice, as head of the National Security Council in
September 2002, declared that the United States could not let the "smoking
gun" of Iraq's nuclear program become a mushroom cloud? Too often
intelligence about clandestine nuclear programs is spotty and can easily be
misread.
Many people might think that technology allows spies to easily snoop on
weapons plants, but that is not true. Satellite images can flag buildings
suspected of being part of a nuclear-weapons program, but they cannot reveal
what goes on inside. It's easy to hide a gas-centrifuge plant, which is
needed to take ordinary uranium and turn it into highly enriched uranium for
weapons. Spy-satellite photos of new construction at pre-1991 Iraqi
nuclear-weapons sites helped convince the CIA that Iraq was building a
uranium-enrichment plant. It turned out to be a repair shop for military
radar.
The chief evidence U.S. intelligence agents mustered on Iraq was a shipment
of thousands of aluminum tubes thought to be key components of a gas
centrifuge. Intercepted nuclear hardware and communications are powerful
intelligence tools, but they're often ambiguous. In the case of Iraq, the
aluminum tubes were probably intended for artillery rockets. Another
tactic—placing "bugs" inside such dual-use equipment and arranging to have
it traded on the black market—uncovered secret installations in Libya. But
it failed in Syria; the dual-use items could not be linked to nuclear
weapons.
Since nuclear materials give off radiation, spies can use sophisticated
detection equipment to identify them. But these detectors work only within
short ranges—they have to be placed or flown near a nuclear site. U.S.
intelligence agents identified Pakistan's gas-centrifuge enrichment plant in
the 1980s by secretly placing radiation detectors in fake rocks and roadside
mile markers. But this won't work in Iran and North Korea. Since nobody
knows where to look for the plants in these countries, getting detectors
within range is nearly impossible.
Spies and defectors can reveal secret sites and the inner workings of
nuclear programs, but this method is hit or miss. Collaborators helped
reveal Pakistan's and Taiwan's nuclear-weapons programs in the 1980s. But
defectors proved to be misleading in Iraq and have not been useful for years
in Iran. Placing spies inside programs is a daunting challenge, especially
in regimes such as Iran and North Korea and in terrorist groups.
Looking back on Iraq and North Korea, we see plainly that information given
voluntarily to the International Atomic Energy Agency has been far more
accurate than anything intelligence agencies have been able to get by
stealth. The IAEA uses commercial satellite imagery, but it can also demand
access to suspect sites and ask tough questions. Inspectors on the ground at
declared nuclear sites and suspect sites can swipe surfaces for traces of
enriched uranium or plutonium. Whereas the intelligence community often
generates suspicions, the IAEA can actually follow up.
The poor track record of nuclear-weapons intelligence makes it almost
impossible to know what to believe about Iran. Those who favor a diplomatic
solution take comfort in claims of U.S. intelligence agencies that Iran
won't obtain nuclear weapons until 2010 or even 2015, but the basis of this
estimate has not been made public. Hawks have tried to show that Iran is
closer to having nuclear weapons, but they have no greater claim on the
truth. Recently the rhetoric has gotten heated. Some Israeli reports claim
that Iran could have enough nuclear-explosive material for a bomb by the end
of this year. (The Iranian opposition group the National Council of
Resistance says that Iran has already crossed this threshold.) U.S. Vice
President Dick Cheney warned in January that a nuclear-armed Iran was a
"serious prospect." Both Cheney's and Israeli comments are insinuations, not
proof.
The most worrisome trend is recent efforts by some U.S. officials to
denigrate the IAEA for not declaring Iran's imminent weapons capability. The
IAEA, acutely aware of the threat of a nuclear Iran, holds that evidence
must be collected systematically and objectively. Heeding these experts
might help repair the damage caused by getting it wrong on Iraq.
Albright, a physicist and former weapons inspector in Iraq, is president and
founder of the Institute for Science and International Security in
Washington, D.C.
Looking for Nukes
By David Albright
Newsweek International
March 26, 2007 issue - How hard could it be to find hundreds of tons of
radioactive nuclear material? We've certainly got plenty of motivation to
keep tabs on this stuff. There's the threat of terrorist groups like Al
Qaeda, the standoff between Pakistan's and India's arsenals and North
Korea's Kim Jong Il. Iran, the next big nuclear challenge, already has
missiles that can strike Israel and a thriving civilian nuclear-power
program. It claims to have no ambition for nuclear weapons, but verifying
this is critical. We must know how much to press for a diplomatic solution
or how seriously to consider a military strike.
Nuclear intelligence, however, is problematic. Despite all the high-tech
gear that intelligence agencies have developed, facts on the ground are so
thin that the whole question of what countries like Iran are doing with
nuclear weapons is vulnerable to manipulation by policymakers. Who can
forget how Condoleezza Rice, as head of the National Security Council in
September 2002, declared that the United States could not let the "smoking
gun" of Iraq's nuclear program become a mushroom cloud? Too often
intelligence about clandestine nuclear programs is spotty and can easily be
misread.
Many people might think that technology allows spies to easily snoop on
weapons plants, but that is not true. Satellite images can flag buildings
suspected of being part of a nuclear-weapons program, but they cannot reveal
what goes on inside. It's easy to hide a gas-centrifuge plant, which is
needed to take ordinary uranium and turn it into highly enriched uranium for
weapons. Spy-satellite photos of new construction at pre-1991 Iraqi
nuclear-weapons sites helped convince the CIA that Iraq was building a
uranium-enrichment plant. It turned out to be a repair shop for military
radar.
The chief evidence U.S. intelligence agents mustered on Iraq was a shipment
of thousands of aluminum tubes thought to be key components of a gas
centrifuge. Intercepted nuclear hardware and communications are powerful
intelligence tools, but they're often ambiguous. In the case of Iraq, the
aluminum tubes were probably intended for artillery rockets. Another
tactic—placing "bugs" inside such dual-use equipment and arranging to have
it traded on the black market—uncovered secret installations in Libya. But
it failed in Syria; the dual-use items could not be linked to nuclear
weapons.
Since nuclear materials give off radiation, spies can use sophisticated
detection equipment to identify them. But these detectors work only within
short ranges—they have to be placed or flown near a nuclear site. U.S.
intelligence agents identified Pakistan's gas-centrifuge enrichment plant in
the 1980s by secretly placing radiation detectors in fake rocks and roadside
mile markers. But this won't work in Iran and North Korea. Since nobody
knows where to look for the plants in these countries, getting detectors
within range is nearly impossible.
Spies and defectors can reveal secret sites and the inner workings of
nuclear programs, but this method is hit or miss. Collaborators helped
reveal Pakistan's and Taiwan's nuclear-weapons programs in the 1980s. But
defectors proved to be misleading in Iraq and have not been useful for years
in Iran. Placing spies inside programs is a daunting challenge, especially
in regimes such as Iran and North Korea and in terrorist groups.
Looking back on Iraq and North Korea, we see plainly that information given
voluntarily to the International Atomic Energy Agency has been far more
accurate than anything intelligence agencies have been able to get by
stealth. The IAEA uses commercial satellite imagery, but it can also demand
access to suspect sites and ask tough questions. Inspectors on the ground at
declared nuclear sites and suspect sites can swipe surfaces for traces of
enriched uranium or plutonium. Whereas the intelligence community often
generates suspicions, the IAEA can actually follow up.
The poor track record of nuclear-weapons intelligence makes it almost
impossible to know what to believe about Iran. Those who favor a diplomatic
solution take comfort in claims of U.S. intelligence agencies that Iran
won't obtain nuclear weapons until 2010 or even 2015, but the basis of this
estimate has not been made public. Hawks have tried to show that Iran is
closer to having nuclear weapons, but they have no greater claim on the
truth. Recently the rhetoric has gotten heated. Some Israeli reports claim
that Iran could have enough nuclear-explosive material for a bomb by the end
of this year. (The Iranian opposition group the National Council of
Resistance says that Iran has already crossed this threshold.) U.S. Vice
President Dick Cheney warned in January that a nuclear-armed Iran was a
"serious prospect." Both Cheney's and Israeli comments are insinuations, not
proof.
The most worrisome trend is recent efforts by some U.S. officials to
denigrate the IAEA for not declaring Iran's imminent weapons capability. The
IAEA, acutely aware of the threat of a nuclear Iran, holds that evidence
must be collected systematically and objectively. Heeding these experts
might help repair the damage caused by getting it wrong on Iraq.
Albright, a physicist and former weapons inspector in Iraq, is president and
founder of the Institute for Science and International Security in
Washington, D.C.