lily
02-28-2007, 12:03 AM
Fareed Zakaria is saying what I've been saying for years. Give the Iraqis jobs. (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17316434?from=rss/site/newsweek/?rf=nwnewsletter)
The Surge That Might Work
It would cost $100 million to restart all of Iraq's state companies. That's
as much as the military will spend in the next 12 hours.
By Fareed Zakaria
Newsweek
March 5, 2007 issue - We are now fighting a war intelligently in Iraq. The
only problem is, it's the last war, not the present one. The United States
has gambled all its efforts on a troop surge that tackles the conflict that
defined Iraq from 2003 to 2005—the insurgency—rather than the civil war now
raging across the country. Worse, in trying to solve yesterday's problem we
are exacerbating today's. In Baghdad, Shiite militias have melted away.
Almost all U.S. military operations are now directed against Sunni
insurgents. If those are successful, the picture could look less violent in
six months, but it will be a dangerous stasis. A senior U.S. military
officer, who is not allowed to speak on the record on these matters, said to
me, "If we continue down the path we're on, the Sunnis in Iraq will throw
their lot behind Al Qaeda, and the Sunni majority in the Arab world will
believe that we helped in the killing and cleansing of their brethren in
Iraq. That's not a good outcome for the security of the American people."
We don't intend to side with anyone. We're trying to be evenhanded and build
a single, democratic nation. But this attempt at neutrality is collapsing in
Iraq's bloody sectarian reality. Last week's uproar over allegations that
Shiite policemen in Baghdad had raped a 20-year-old Sunni woman vividly
illustrates how trust between the two communities has been shattered. Shiite
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki first ordered an investigation, then 12 hours
later declared the woman a liar, freed and rewarded the alleged rapists and
later fired a Sunni official who had called for an unbiased investigation.
Meanwhile we're stuck in the middle, promising to uncover the truth while
both sides are convinced that we've betrayed them. This is the definition of
a no-win strategy.
The United States needs to find fresh approaches that won't feed the
sectarian dynamic and will address the needs of ordinary Iraqis, not the
political elites who are jockeying for power. Most important, we need to
find a strategy whose costs are sustainable. Militarily this means drawing
down our forces to around 60,000 troops and concentrating on Al Qaeda in
Anbar province. The surge we should be pushing instead is a political one,
and even more critically, an economic one.
An economic surge is long overdue. One of the less-remarked-upon blunders of
the Coalition Provisional Authority was that—consumed by free-market
ideology—it shut down all of Iraq's state-owned enterprises. This crippled
the bulk of Iraq's non-oil economy, threw hundreds of thousands of workers
into the streets and further alienated the Sunnis, who were the managerial
class of the country. The economic effects of this decision have been
seismic. For example, Iraq's agricultural productivity has plummeted because
fertilizer plants were summarily closed. Unemployment in non-Kurdish Iraq
remains close to 50 percent, which helps explain why so many young men are
joining gangs, militias and insurgent groups. For the moment at least,
democracy in Iraq has sharpened the country's divisions. Capitalism and
commerce can make them less relevant. That is the lesson of many
conflict-ridden countries from Northern Ireland to Mozambique to Vietnam.
Paul Brinkley, a talented deputy under secretary of Defense, is trying to
get the bulk of these state-owned factories up and running. He's already
restarted a bus factory in Iskandariyah, south of Baghdad, and the
experience has been telling. Hundreds of workers still in the area showed up
for work and the machines are now humming busily. There have been no attacks
on the factory. "The insurgents attack people working for the police, Army
or the Americans. They do not want to alienate locals trying to make ends
meet," said one official working on the project.
Of the original 193 state enterprises, 143 could be restarted soon, says
Brinkley. Management and workers are desperate to get jobs. The problem is
money. Brinkley points out that his next target, a ceramics factory in
Ramadi, is only waiting for two generators before it can reopen. They cost
$1 million each. But funds for this purpose are hard to find. Washington has
pledged more than $18 billion to fund "reconstruction" in Iraq but will not
appropriate a cent to start up state-owned Iraqi companies. The Iraqi
government has billions in oil revenue of its own but is so dysfunctional
that it cannot move a new project through the system. So the factory is
idle. A major global consulting firm has reviewed Iraq's state-owned
enterprises and estimated that it would cost $100 million to restart all of
them and employ more than 150,000 Iraqis—$100 million. That's as much money
as the American military will spend in Iraq in the next 12 hours.
The Surge That Might Work
It would cost $100 million to restart all of Iraq's state companies. That's
as much as the military will spend in the next 12 hours.
By Fareed Zakaria
Newsweek
March 5, 2007 issue - We are now fighting a war intelligently in Iraq. The
only problem is, it's the last war, not the present one. The United States
has gambled all its efforts on a troop surge that tackles the conflict that
defined Iraq from 2003 to 2005—the insurgency—rather than the civil war now
raging across the country. Worse, in trying to solve yesterday's problem we
are exacerbating today's. In Baghdad, Shiite militias have melted away.
Almost all U.S. military operations are now directed against Sunni
insurgents. If those are successful, the picture could look less violent in
six months, but it will be a dangerous stasis. A senior U.S. military
officer, who is not allowed to speak on the record on these matters, said to
me, "If we continue down the path we're on, the Sunnis in Iraq will throw
their lot behind Al Qaeda, and the Sunni majority in the Arab world will
believe that we helped in the killing and cleansing of their brethren in
Iraq. That's not a good outcome for the security of the American people."
We don't intend to side with anyone. We're trying to be evenhanded and build
a single, democratic nation. But this attempt at neutrality is collapsing in
Iraq's bloody sectarian reality. Last week's uproar over allegations that
Shiite policemen in Baghdad had raped a 20-year-old Sunni woman vividly
illustrates how trust between the two communities has been shattered. Shiite
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki first ordered an investigation, then 12 hours
later declared the woman a liar, freed and rewarded the alleged rapists and
later fired a Sunni official who had called for an unbiased investigation.
Meanwhile we're stuck in the middle, promising to uncover the truth while
both sides are convinced that we've betrayed them. This is the definition of
a no-win strategy.
The United States needs to find fresh approaches that won't feed the
sectarian dynamic and will address the needs of ordinary Iraqis, not the
political elites who are jockeying for power. Most important, we need to
find a strategy whose costs are sustainable. Militarily this means drawing
down our forces to around 60,000 troops and concentrating on Al Qaeda in
Anbar province. The surge we should be pushing instead is a political one,
and even more critically, an economic one.
An economic surge is long overdue. One of the less-remarked-upon blunders of
the Coalition Provisional Authority was that—consumed by free-market
ideology—it shut down all of Iraq's state-owned enterprises. This crippled
the bulk of Iraq's non-oil economy, threw hundreds of thousands of workers
into the streets and further alienated the Sunnis, who were the managerial
class of the country. The economic effects of this decision have been
seismic. For example, Iraq's agricultural productivity has plummeted because
fertilizer plants were summarily closed. Unemployment in non-Kurdish Iraq
remains close to 50 percent, which helps explain why so many young men are
joining gangs, militias and insurgent groups. For the moment at least,
democracy in Iraq has sharpened the country's divisions. Capitalism and
commerce can make them less relevant. That is the lesson of many
conflict-ridden countries from Northern Ireland to Mozambique to Vietnam.
Paul Brinkley, a talented deputy under secretary of Defense, is trying to
get the bulk of these state-owned factories up and running. He's already
restarted a bus factory in Iskandariyah, south of Baghdad, and the
experience has been telling. Hundreds of workers still in the area showed up
for work and the machines are now humming busily. There have been no attacks
on the factory. "The insurgents attack people working for the police, Army
or the Americans. They do not want to alienate locals trying to make ends
meet," said one official working on the project.
Of the original 193 state enterprises, 143 could be restarted soon, says
Brinkley. Management and workers are desperate to get jobs. The problem is
money. Brinkley points out that his next target, a ceramics factory in
Ramadi, is only waiting for two generators before it can reopen. They cost
$1 million each. But funds for this purpose are hard to find. Washington has
pledged more than $18 billion to fund "reconstruction" in Iraq but will not
appropriate a cent to start up state-owned Iraqi companies. The Iraqi
government has billions in oil revenue of its own but is so dysfunctional
that it cannot move a new project through the system. So the factory is
idle. A major global consulting firm has reviewed Iraq's state-owned
enterprises and estimated that it would cost $100 million to restart all of
them and employ more than 150,000 Iraqis—$100 million. That's as much money
as the American military will spend in Iraq in the next 12 hours.