lily
01-10-2007, 08:38 PM
The generals on the ground, the joint chiefs and Maliki himself has said extra troops are not wanted and will do no good. Why the big hurry? Seems like that' s how we got into this mess, not listening and being in such a hurry. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/09/AR2007010901872.html?referrer=email)
With Iraq Speech, Bush to Pull Away From His Generals
By Michael Abramowitz, Robin Wright and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, January 10, 2007; Page A01
When President Bush goes before the American people tonight to outline his
new strategy for Iraq, he will be doing something he has avoided since the
invasion of Iraq in March 2003: ordering his top military brass to take
action they initially resisted and advised against.
Bush talks frequently of his disdain for micromanaging the war effort and
for second-guessing his commanders. "It's important to trust the judgment of
the military when they're making military plans," he told The Washington
Post in an interview last month. "I'm a strict adherer to the command
structure."
But over the past two months, as the security situation in Iraq has
deteriorated and U.S. public support for the war has dropped, Bush has
pushed back against his top military advisers and the commanders in Iraq: He
has fashioned a plan to add up to 20,000 troops to the 132,000 U.S. service
members already on the ground. As Bush plans it, the military will soon be
"surging" in Iraq two months after an election that many Democrats
interpreted as a mandate to begin withdrawing troops.
Pentagon insiders say members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have long opposed
the increase in troops and are only grudgingly going along with the plan
because they have been promised that the military escalation will be matched
by renewed political and economic efforts in Iraq. Gen. John P. Abizaid, the
outgoing head of Central Command, said less than two months ago that adding
U.S. troops was not the answer for Iraq.
Bush's decision appears to mark the first major disagreement between the
White House and key elements of the Pentagon over the Iraq war since Gen.
Eric K. Shinseki, then the Army chief of staff, split with the
administration in the spring of 2003 over the planned size of the occupation
force, which he regarded as too small.
It may also be a sign of increasing assertiveness from a commander in chief
described by former aides as relatively passive about questioning the advice
of his military advisers. In going for more troops, Bush is picking an
option that seems to have little favor beyond the White House and a handful
of hawks on Capitol Hill and in think tanks who have been promoting the idea
almost since the time of the invasion.
"It seems clear to me that the president has taken more positive control of
this strategy," said Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.), one of those pushing
for more troops. "He understands that the safety of the nation and his
legacy is all on the line here."
Others familiar with Bush's thinking said he had not been happy with the
military's advice. "The president wasn't satisfied with the recommendations
he was getting, and he thought we need a strategy that was more purposeful
and likely to succeed if the Iraqis could make that possible," said Philip
D. Zelikow, who recently stepped down as State Department counselor after
being involved with Iraqi policy the past two years.
This impulse may well expose Bush to more criticism from Democrats on
Capitol Hill, who have sharply condemned him for not listening to Shinseki's
counsel in the beginning. "I think a number of our military leaders have
pulled their punches, and will continue to pull their punches publicly,"
Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), the new chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, said yesterday.
There is little question that more troops for Iraq seemed far from the
conventional wisdom in Washington after the beating Bush and the Republican
Party took in the midterm elections Nov. 7. Indeed, when Bush met with Iraqi
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Amman, Jordan, on Nov. 30, Maliki did not
ask for more American troops as part of a new Baghdad security plan he
presented to Bush, U.S. officials said.
Maliki's idea was to lower the U.S. profile, not raise it. "The message in
Amman was that he wanted to take the lead and put an Iraqi face on it. He
wanted to control his own forces," said a U.S. official familiar with the
visit.
Another problem for the administration was the Iraq Study Group, the
prestigious bipartisan panel headed by former secretary of state James A.
Baker III, a Republican, and former congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.).
Soon after Bush returned from Jordan, the group delivered its
recommendations, including proposing a high-level dialogue with Iran and
Syria to help stabilize Iraq and setting a goal of early 2008 for the
removal of almost all U.S. combat troops.
With Iraq Speech, Bush to Pull Away From His Generals
By Michael Abramowitz, Robin Wright and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, January 10, 2007; Page A01
When President Bush goes before the American people tonight to outline his
new strategy for Iraq, he will be doing something he has avoided since the
invasion of Iraq in March 2003: ordering his top military brass to take
action they initially resisted and advised against.
Bush talks frequently of his disdain for micromanaging the war effort and
for second-guessing his commanders. "It's important to trust the judgment of
the military when they're making military plans," he told The Washington
Post in an interview last month. "I'm a strict adherer to the command
structure."
But over the past two months, as the security situation in Iraq has
deteriorated and U.S. public support for the war has dropped, Bush has
pushed back against his top military advisers and the commanders in Iraq: He
has fashioned a plan to add up to 20,000 troops to the 132,000 U.S. service
members already on the ground. As Bush plans it, the military will soon be
"surging" in Iraq two months after an election that many Democrats
interpreted as a mandate to begin withdrawing troops.
Pentagon insiders say members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have long opposed
the increase in troops and are only grudgingly going along with the plan
because they have been promised that the military escalation will be matched
by renewed political and economic efforts in Iraq. Gen. John P. Abizaid, the
outgoing head of Central Command, said less than two months ago that adding
U.S. troops was not the answer for Iraq.
Bush's decision appears to mark the first major disagreement between the
White House and key elements of the Pentagon over the Iraq war since Gen.
Eric K. Shinseki, then the Army chief of staff, split with the
administration in the spring of 2003 over the planned size of the occupation
force, which he regarded as too small.
It may also be a sign of increasing assertiveness from a commander in chief
described by former aides as relatively passive about questioning the advice
of his military advisers. In going for more troops, Bush is picking an
option that seems to have little favor beyond the White House and a handful
of hawks on Capitol Hill and in think tanks who have been promoting the idea
almost since the time of the invasion.
"It seems clear to me that the president has taken more positive control of
this strategy," said Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.), one of those pushing
for more troops. "He understands that the safety of the nation and his
legacy is all on the line here."
Others familiar with Bush's thinking said he had not been happy with the
military's advice. "The president wasn't satisfied with the recommendations
he was getting, and he thought we need a strategy that was more purposeful
and likely to succeed if the Iraqis could make that possible," said Philip
D. Zelikow, who recently stepped down as State Department counselor after
being involved with Iraqi policy the past two years.
This impulse may well expose Bush to more criticism from Democrats on
Capitol Hill, who have sharply condemned him for not listening to Shinseki's
counsel in the beginning. "I think a number of our military leaders have
pulled their punches, and will continue to pull their punches publicly,"
Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.), the new chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, said yesterday.
There is little question that more troops for Iraq seemed far from the
conventional wisdom in Washington after the beating Bush and the Republican
Party took in the midterm elections Nov. 7. Indeed, when Bush met with Iraqi
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in Amman, Jordan, on Nov. 30, Maliki did not
ask for more American troops as part of a new Baghdad security plan he
presented to Bush, U.S. officials said.
Maliki's idea was to lower the U.S. profile, not raise it. "The message in
Amman was that he wanted to take the lead and put an Iraqi face on it. He
wanted to control his own forces," said a U.S. official familiar with the
visit.
Another problem for the administration was the Iraq Study Group, the
prestigious bipartisan panel headed by former secretary of state James A.
Baker III, a Republican, and former congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.).
Soon after Bush returned from Jordan, the group delivered its
recommendations, including proposing a high-level dialogue with Iran and
Syria to help stabilize Iraq and setting a goal of early 2008 for the
removal of almost all U.S. combat troops.