lily
04-21-2008, 11:09 PM
What happens after they hit the front page. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/20/AR2008042002227.html?hpid=moreheadlines)
Few Clear Wins in U.S. Anti-Terror Cases
Moving Early on Domestic Suspects Often Does Not Bring Convictions
By Carrie Johnson and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, April 21, 2008; Page A01
When seven ragtag men in a Miami religious sect were indicted in 2006 for
their role in a bizarre plot to blow up the FBI Miami office and Chicago's
Sears Tower, then- Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales said the case
represented "a new brand of terrorism" among homegrown gangs that "may prove
to be as dangerous as groups like al-Qaeda."
Justice Department officials used similar rhetoric in a 2003 case against a
Tampa-area man and his associates who allegedly supported a reign of terror
by a violent Palestinian group. The officials did so again in a 2004 case
involving a Dallas charity known as the Holy Land Foundation, which they
said provided "blood money" to finance overseas suicide bombings.
But juries in all three cases saw things differently than the government's
national security team. In the most recent disappointment for federal
prosecutors, a jury last week did not reach a verdict in the Miami case for
the second time. In the Holy Land case, one defendant was cleared of the
charges and jurors deadlocked on charges against the others. After 12 days
of deliberation, jurors in the Tampa case acquitted two men and could not
agree on the charges against the main defendant.
The department's domestic terrorism record to date -- no new attacks, but
few blockbuster convictions and some high-profile hung juries or
acquittals -- has provoked criticism of its early strategy for going after
homegrown terrorist cells and the people who fund plots well before deadly
events occur.
Jurors appear to be particularly troubled by a controversial element in the
Miami case, part of several other early prosecutions, in which FBI
informants encouraged others to perform acts they otherwise may not have
done.
This week, federal prosecutors in Miami will announce whether they will seek
to try the defendants for the third time. The government's incentive to do
so is powerful: Two years ago, it intended the case to be a model for
intervention against potential terrorists before they acquire the weapons
and insight needed to act.
Independent commissions have urged the FBI to become more aggressive at
detecting threats and neutralizing them before they explode. But what
emerged was an approach where investigators sometimes acted very early,
charging conspiracies to commit minor crimes or immigration and tax
violations as a way to preempt potential threats, while avoiding the
disclosure of sensitive intelligence.
Few Clear Wins in U.S. Anti-Terror Cases
Moving Early on Domestic Suspects Often Does Not Bring Convictions
By Carrie Johnson and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, April 21, 2008; Page A01
When seven ragtag men in a Miami religious sect were indicted in 2006 for
their role in a bizarre plot to blow up the FBI Miami office and Chicago's
Sears Tower, then- Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales said the case
represented "a new brand of terrorism" among homegrown gangs that "may prove
to be as dangerous as groups like al-Qaeda."
Justice Department officials used similar rhetoric in a 2003 case against a
Tampa-area man and his associates who allegedly supported a reign of terror
by a violent Palestinian group. The officials did so again in a 2004 case
involving a Dallas charity known as the Holy Land Foundation, which they
said provided "blood money" to finance overseas suicide bombings.
But juries in all three cases saw things differently than the government's
national security team. In the most recent disappointment for federal
prosecutors, a jury last week did not reach a verdict in the Miami case for
the second time. In the Holy Land case, one defendant was cleared of the
charges and jurors deadlocked on charges against the others. After 12 days
of deliberation, jurors in the Tampa case acquitted two men and could not
agree on the charges against the main defendant.
The department's domestic terrorism record to date -- no new attacks, but
few blockbuster convictions and some high-profile hung juries or
acquittals -- has provoked criticism of its early strategy for going after
homegrown terrorist cells and the people who fund plots well before deadly
events occur.
Jurors appear to be particularly troubled by a controversial element in the
Miami case, part of several other early prosecutions, in which FBI
informants encouraged others to perform acts they otherwise may not have
done.
This week, federal prosecutors in Miami will announce whether they will seek
to try the defendants for the third time. The government's incentive to do
so is powerful: Two years ago, it intended the case to be a model for
intervention against potential terrorists before they acquire the weapons
and insight needed to act.
Independent commissions have urged the FBI to become more aggressive at
detecting threats and neutralizing them before they explode. But what
emerged was an approach where investigators sometimes acted very early,
charging conspiracies to commit minor crimes or immigration and tax
violations as a way to preempt potential threats, while avoiding the
disclosure of sensitive intelligence.